Dr. Kevin Lynch
发布时间:2017-04-20 浏览次数:372

C u r r i c u l u m    V i t a e

Dr. Kevin LynchAssociate Professor

 

Email: kevinlynch405@eircom.net

AOS: Philosophy of psychology and mind.

AOC: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Ethics, Logic, Ancient Philosophy.

 

Current position: Associate Professor of Philosophy, Huaqiao University, Xiamen, China

 

Educational Details

 

PhD:  Oct 2007-Aug 2011 (viva Dec 12th 2011), University of Warwick, U.K.

         Title: ‘A Defence of a Deflationary Theory of Self-Deception’. Passed with no

         corrections.

         Supervisor:  Johannes Roessler

         Examiners: Martin Davies (Oxford) and Matt Soteriou (Warwick)

 

M.A:   Sept. 2003 - June 2004, Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland.

          1st class honour.

 

B.A:   Sept 1997 – June 2002, Philosophy and Sociology, Maynooth University, Ireland. Upper 2nd

         class honour.

 

Research

Publications (articles):

  • Forthcoming. An Agentive Non-Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

  • Forthcoming. The Divisibility of Basic Actions. Analysis.

  • 2016. Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception. Philosophical Studies 173(2), pp. 505-523.

  • 2014. The Vagaries of Psychoanalytic Interpretation: An Investigation into the Causes of the Consensus Problem in Psychoanalysis. Philosophia 42(3): pp. 779-799.

  • 2014. Self-Deception and Shifts of Attention. Philosophical Explorations 17(1), pp. 63-75.

  • 2013. Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief. Erkenntnis 78(6), pp. 1337-1345.

  • 2012. A Multiple Realization Thesis for Natural Kinds. European Journal of Philosophy 20(3), pp. 389-406.

  • 2012. On the ‘Tension’ Inherent in Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 25(3), pp. 433-450.

  • 2010. Self-Deception, Religious Belief, and the False Belief Condition. The Heythrop Journal 51(6), pp. 1073-1074.

  • 2009. Prospects for an Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception. Abstracta 5(2), pp. 126-138.

    (Book Reviews)

  • 2016. Review of The Myth of the Intuitive by Max Deutsch. Philosophical Psychology 29(7), pp. 1088-1091.

  • 2016. Review of Self-Knowledge for Humans by Quassim Cassam. Dialectica 70(1), pp. 113-119.

  • 2015. Review of Subliminal: How your Unconscious Mind Rules your Behavior by Leonard Mlodinow. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22(9-10), pp. 229-234.

  • 2015. Review of Irrationality by Lisa Bortolotti. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23(4), pp. 605-609.

  • 2015. Review of The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker. Philosophy 90(2), pp. 332-336.

     

    Papers in progress:

  • Knowing What An Experience Is Like and the Standard Theory of Knowledge-wh. Under review.

  • Knowing How, Basic Actions, and Ways of Doing Things. Under review.

    Conference presentations and invited talks:

  • Feb. 2016. Knowing How, Basic Actions, and Ways of Doing Things. Meeting of the Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy, Chungang University, Seoul, South Korea.

  • July 2014. Knowing What an Experience is Like and the Standard Theory of Knowledge-wh. European Epistemology Network Meeting, Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain.

  • July 2013. Is Knowing What an Experience is Like Reducible to Propositional Knowledge? Aristotelian Society Joint Session, University of Exeter, UK.

  • Feb. 2013. The Vagaries of Psychoanalytic Interpretation. Invited Talk, Department of Philosophy, Maynooth University, Ireland.

  • Sept. 2012. The Role of Intentional Action in Self-Deception. 1st International Krakow Conference in Cognitive Science, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.

  • Sept. 2012. Response to Ema Sullivan-Bissett: “Why It’s Contingent that you Can’t Believe at Will”. 16th Annual Conference of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association, University of Edinburgh, UK.

  • Aug. 2012. Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief. 20th Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Senate House, London, UK.

  • Feb. 2011. The Traditional Understanding of Self-Deception. 18th International Meeting of the Hongo Metaphysics Club, University of Tokyo, Japan.

  • Oct. 2010. Self-Deception and Degrees of Conviction. The Nature of Belief: The Ontology of Doxastic Attitudes, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark.

  • Dec. 2009. Response to Alva Noë. Mindgrad, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.

  • July 2009. Multiple Realization for Mental and Natural Kinds. 13th Annual Conference of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association, King's College, London, UK. Paper published in conference proceedings.

  • July 2009. Multiple Realization for Mental and Natural Kinds. Metaphysics of Mind Graduate Conference, University of Edinburgh, UK.

  • July 2009. Alfred Mele's Criticism of the Intentionalist Account of Self-Deception. Open Minds IV graduate conference, University of Manchester, UK.

  • March 2009. Self-Deception and the Control of Attention. Second European Graduate School, Internationales Begegnungszentrum der Ruhr-Universität, Bochum, Germany.